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IN THE 
Supreme Court ~f Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2668 
JOHN THOMAS CARTER AND IDUGENE PEARSON 
MACEMORE, Plaintiffs iii Error, 
versus 
THE C.01\fMONWE.ALTH OF VIRGI,NI.A, 
Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Justices of the s,wp·mme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioners, John Thomas Carter and Eugene Pear-
son l\facemore, respectfully represent that they are aggrieved 
by final judgments of the Circuit ·Court of Rappahannoek · 
County, entered September 14, 1942, whereby petitioners were 
convicted on a warrant issued by l\L A. Compton,· .Justice 
of the Peace, on May 20, 1942, which said warrant charged 
petitioners with the violation of the provisions of Section 
49-a of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act of' Virginia and 
Sections 42 and 44 of a Regulation of the Virginia Alcoholic 
Beverage Cout.rol Board, known as Order No. A-1, adopted 
Aug'llst 30, 1940; in that they '·'did transport more than one 
gallon of alcoholic beverages, namely, 56 cases, containing 
168 gallons of whiskey, from a point' in the State of 
2• Maryland within and into the State of Virginia and in 
~Rappahannock County, Virginia, without having- posted 
with the Virginia Al.coholic Beverage Control Board a bond 
with approved suret'y, as required by law; and; 
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'' E1urther, that the bill of lading or other memorandum of 
shipment did not specify tbe route to be traveled by such 
vehicle while in Virgini~; and, . 
'' Further, the consignee shown on the bill of lading or 
other memorandum of ~bipment was a person who did not 
have a legal right to receive such alcoholic beverages at the 
point of destination sho,~n on the bill of lading or other mem-
orandum of shipment, hamely, R. M. "\Villiard, T/ A Eagle 
Distilling Company, Route 1, Thomasville, North Carolina.'' 
A transcript of the record of the case accompanies this 
petition and, for convenience, we shall hereafter refer to the 
portions the1·eof containing the various pleadings and facts 
of the case. 
THE FACTS. 
The case was tried upon an ag-reed stipulation of facts 
which was incorporated as a part of the record in the bill of 
exceptions (R., pp. 11-14). 
Briefly summarized the facts are these. On May 20, 1942, 
petitioners received frdm a wholesale liquor dealer in Dor-
sey, Maryland, a shipment of whiskey for the account of a 
consignee in Thomasville, N ortb Carolina. The whiskey was 
loaded onto a truck which was driven into Virginia by peti-
tioners who intended to transport the whiskey through Vir-
ginia into North Carolina, but they were apprehended 
3• and arrested in Rappahannock *County. 
When apprehended petitioners produced a bill of lad-
ing showing the correct amount of whiskey contained in the 
shipment. The bill of l~ding disclosed the consignee to be a 
resident of Thomasville( North Carolina. Under the laws of 
North Carolina this consig11ee could not lawfully receive the 
whiskey at its destination. The bill of lading contained no 
routeing for the truck to follow while in Virginia. 
. The truck was registered in the name of Healton Miller, a 
resident of North Carolina, who had posted bond with ap-
proved surety as required under a regulation of the Vir-
ginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, but the Board had 
previously notified Miller that the bond had been cancelled 
upon information that he had the reputation of being a. boot-
legger in North Carolina. There was no evidence that Miller 
had ever violated· the laws of Virginia. ' 
J. T. Carter and E. P. ::M:acemore v. Commonwealth. 3 
THE PLEADINGS. 
The case was set for hearing in the Circuit Court of Rap-
pahannock County on July 13, 1942, on the aforementioned 
warrant. On that day the petitioners appeared in open court 
and entered their pleas of ·not guilty to the charges con-
tained in the warrant, waived jury trial and consented to 
be tried jointly by the Judge. Petitioners and the· Cou11110n-
wealth then submitted to the Judge an agre.ed stipulation of 
all of the facts of the case (R., p. 8). 
Thereafter the petitioners moved the court to strike out 
all of the evidence and to dismiss the warrant on five grounds 
assig11ed, which motion was overruled a.nd to which ruling 
4* petitioners *excepted on the grounds stated. (Bill of 
Exceptions, R., pp. 14-16.) 
On September 14, 1942, the court entered judgment against 
petitioners finding them both guilty of the charges contained 
ment the petitioners excepted (R., p. 9). 
Tl1ereafter the petitioners moved the court for a new trial 
in the warrant and fixing their punishment, to which judg-
on the same five grounds assigned in their previous motion 
to strike out all of the evidence and to dismiss the warrant, 
whiGh motion wa~ overruled and to which ruling the petition-
.. ers ~xcepted on the grounds stated (Bill of ,Exceptiqns, R., 
p. 16). 
On September 28, 1942, on motion of petitioners execution 
of the judgment was stayed for ninety days pending the pre-
senting· of this petition (R., p. 10). 
A bill of exceptions ivas granted the petitioners by the 
court on September 28, 1942 {R., pp. 10-16). 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
Petitioners assig-n as error the rulings of the court below 
in overruling their motion to strike out all of the evidence 
and to dismiss the warrant; in entering final judgment 
ag·ainst them; and in overr,uling their motion for a new trial. 
The grounds of tl1e motions and the objection to the judg·-
ment were identical and, therefore, in order to avoid ob-
viously unnecessary repetition we shall state our assig'll-
ments of error as one assig·nment. (In this assignment -of 
error and our arg11ment we have chang·ed the order of t11e 
p:rounds Rtated in our motions before the court below in order 
to present a more logical a?d convenient sequence.) 
I 
5~ *The Court below erred in overruling· petitioners' mo-
tion to strike out all of the evidence and dismiss the war;.. 
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rant, in entering· final judgment against petitioners, and in 
overruling petitioners' motion for a new trial on the grounds 
· that the act of the Virginia Legislature and the Rules and 
Regulations of the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Board made pursuant thereto which petitioners were charged 
with violating were uncon.stitutional and void, in the follow-· 
ing particulars, namely ~-
I • (1) That said .Act is unconstitutional insofar that it con-
. fers upon said Board the power to make said regulations1 in 
~hat it vio~ates Article i III of t~e Constitution of ~irgi~ia 
m attemptmg to deleg·ate to said Board pt'(rely legislative 
powers and functions. I 
(2) That under the provisions of Section 5 and Section 
49-a of the .Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, Chapter 94 of 
.Acts of the General .Assembly of Virginia of 1934, as amended, 
Virg·inia Code Section [4675 ( 49-a) there was no authority 
·delegated to make such, regulations as Sections 42 and 44 of 
regulations of the Vfrginia .Alcoholic Beverage . Control 
Board, known· as Order -Number A-1, adopt~d .August 30, 
1940, in that such regulations were not within the ·scope of· 
the powers delegated tb said Board under said Act. · 
(3) That said Act and said Regulations are unconstitutional 
in that they violate Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Con-
1:?titution of the United i States reg·ulating commerce between 
the States and/or imp~sing a burden upon i11;terstate com-
merce-. 
( 4) That the cancellation of the bond of Healton Miller on 
May 1, 1942, by the said Board was a discriminatory action 
and was unlawful and ,yithout authority under the provisions 
of said Act and said Regulations. ·· 
6* * (5) That the cancellation of the bond of I-Iealton 
Miller on Ma.y 1, 1942, by the said Board was unlawful 
and violative of the defendants' rights under the provisions 
of .Article I, Section 8J Clause 3 of the Constitution of the 
United States. 1 
ARGUMENT. 
We shall sub-divide 6ur arg·ument under the five grounds 
assigned in our assignment of error above. . 
For convenience, Section 5 and Section · 49-~ · of the Alco-
holic Beverag·e Controi Act and Sections 42 and 44 of the 
Regulations of the .Alcoholic Beverage Control Board are 
set out verbatim iu th~ appendix to this petition. 
I • 




.A,re the '.Acts of ·Assembly p1tirporti11,g to d,~legate. the right 
to make rules and regula,tions cons.titittional · and valid'! 
This question of the validity of 4elegation of the rule-
, making power is an exceedingly important one and is by no 
n;ieans .free from difficulty. It is conceded that; in this 4ay 
of increasing complexity of goverI1ment; it is inevitable that 
administrative agencies and bureaus must increase in num-
ber and in importance (but neither convenience nor .the exi-
'. gencies of.the occasion should be permitted to undermine the 
constitutional principles upon·-which the Commonwealth was 
·e~tabllshed, and of those principles none is more basic. than 
the 1:tbsoh~te separation of executive, legislative, and judicial 
duties and functions in accordance with Article III of the 
Constitution or Virginia. ''The legisl(:ttive power of the. l . 
. Tt -•State ·shall be vested in a g·eneral assembly. • • • "The i 
assembly .is charged witp. the power and duty of making i 
the l~ws for the ~ti:J,te without the right. to divest itself of I · 
tliis function oi· deleg·ate it to executive or administrative \t 
officers ; subject only to the qualification, if it is 3: quali13,ca-
tio11, that the legislature having fixed the policy and the legal \' ·· 
. principles and standar-ds~ it may properly delegate· to ad.min-· · · . 
istrative agencies the duty· of :finding· the fact to which f!}.ose 
· principles shall apply and some discretion in applying fhose 
principles to mere matters of detail within the policy ot prin:-
ciple enunciated. _ · 
This. principle. has been jealously guarded by this . Court 
, as- is evidenced by recent decisions · op. the subject. . · 
· In.,Thompson v. -Smith, 155 Va. 367, an ordinance of the ·. 
City of Lynchburg provided that '.'.The Chief of Police is 
authorized· and di;rected to revoke the permit of any driver 
{automobile) who, in his opinion, becomes unfit to drive an 
automobile on the streets of the o.i-ty". The v;alidity of this 
ordinances was attacked on the ground th~t it was ·an improper 
delegation of leg·islative powe~ and in holding·the ordinance 
invaltd this Court, through Mr. Justice Epes, said-
. , 
"It is a fuiidf,l.mental pr;inciple of our system of govern-
ment that the -rights· of men are to be. determined by the law 
itself, and not by the let or leave of administrative officers 
or bureaus. This principle ought not to be surrendered for 
convenience or in effect nullified for the sake of expediency. 
It_ is the prerogative and function of the legislative hra;nch· · 
9if!; the g·overnment, whether ~tate. or municipal, to determine· 
an.¢{ declare what the law shall .be and the legislative bl.'anch · 
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the o·overnment may not divest itself of this function 
delegate it to executive or administrative officers." . 
* * * * • 
I 
1 8* *''In principle, legislation and administration are quite 
1 distinct powers; but in practical application the - line 
which separates their exercise is not clearly marked or easily 
- defined. However, in their definition in practical application 
lies the di:ff erence between government by leg·islation and 
government by bureaucracy, which, though contrary to the 
g·enius of our government, some courts have gone far towards 
~ustaining·. '' 
''Mere matters of detail within the policy and the legal 
principles and standards established by the statute or or-
dinance, may properly be left to administrative discretion, 
for the determination of such matters of detail is more es-
sentially ministerial than legislative. In declaring the policy 
of the law and fixing the legal principles and standards which 
are to control in the administration of the law, general terms, 
which gets precision from the technical knowledge or sense 
and experience of men and thereby become reasonably cer-
tain, may be used; and an administrative officer or bureau 
may be invested with the power to ascertain and determine 
whether the qualifications, facts or conditions comprehended 
in and required by such general terms exist, and whether the 
provisions of the law so :fixed and declared have been com-
plied with in accordance with the generally accepted meaning 
of the words. 111.ittual Film, Corp. v. Ohio Inwustrial Com-
niission, supra; Yoe Bow v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 269, 124 
N. E. 132, 12 A. L. R. 1424; Block vt Chicago, 239 Ill. 251, 87 
N. E. 1011, 130 Am. St. Rep. 219." \ 
"That portion of the ordinance here in question which 
ant onzes 1e c ne of po ice revoke the permit of any 
driver, who, in his opinion, becomes unfit to drive an auto-
mobile on the streets of the city', fails to declare the policy 
of th l w 1 x e O'a rincip es_ w ich re . r e 
iscretion of the chief of po ice m the revocation of licenses 
in detennining wlrnt constitutes unfitness to drive an auto-
mobile on the streets of the city; and is void because it dele-
' I 
J. T. Carter and E. P. Macemore v. Collllll:onwealth. 7 I gates powers essentially legislative to an administrative of-ficer." · - · 
9- ·~ t~ia v. Roanoke, 179 Va. 47, decided January 19, 
194 , cense· to operate a pool room was revoked by 
the City Manager of Roanoke under authority of an ordinance 
which provided-
'' The license shall be a personal privilege and shall be 
granted and transferred only. upo11 the order of the . City 
Manager.'' 
The Court held..:the ordinanee.J:Q...@.. invalid and in the course 
of the opinion by Mr. Chief Justice CamP,bell, said-
."It must be conceded that, under the police power with 
which the city is invested, it had the unquestioned power to 
legally regulate the granting of a license to conduct a pool 
. room, or even to prohibit the pperation of a pool room in the 
city. However, the exercise of the police power must be a 
valid exercise thereof, and when in its exercise it encounters 
the barriers erected by th~tate and Federal Constitutions, 
it can proceed no further. · 
"In Thompson v. Smi , 55 Va. 367, 154 S. E. 579, 71 A. 
L. R .. 604, J.\iir. Justice Epes said : • • • '' 
(The language from Justice Epes' opinion which is quoted 
by us in the first paragraph of our discussion of Thompson 
v. Smith, siepra, is here quoted with approval.) 
"It is by this legal tape that the rights of the defendant 
are to be measured. When the tape is placed upon the or-
dinance in question; it clearly appears that it violates Ar-
ticle ·I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution and the 14th. 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, by rea-
son of its failure to provide for notice and hearing, by un-
dertaking to make the determination of the city manager final 
and unrevjewable, and by not providing for a judicial review 
thereof. 
'' If we extend the analysis of the ordinance, it is plain 
that it arbitrarily empowers the city manager, if he be so 
inclined, to refuse an ecclei;iastic applying for a license to 
conduct a. pool room, and to grant a license to the most no-
torious criminal in the city. It further empowers the city 
manager to deny to the one-time gambler the rig·ht to show, 
if he can do so, tl1at he has reformed. 
,· 
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10• · 4"' 'The legality o~ the ordinance is to lie tested in_ot 
by what has been d,one under it, but by what may, by its 
a,uthority, be done. (Italics supplied.) 
"It further appears, . from an analysis of .the ordinance, 
that it delegates legislative authority to a ministerial offi-
cer. It is true that the law-makin~ body may make a legis-
lative determination under the police power, . without notice 
and hearing to the pedon affected, but the legislative body 
has no power to delegate to a board or an administrat~e offt~ 
cer its own power to act, without notice and hearin!J.:r;, This 
was specifically held in Thompson v. Smith, supra. (Italics 
supplied.) 
'' Our conclusion is that the ordinance under which the de-
fendant was tried and convicted is invalid. 
"It follows, therefore, that the judgment of the lower 
court will be reversed ap.d annulled, and an order will be en-
tered in this court dis$arging the defendant from further 
custody.'' 
These principles are. by no means novel or restricted to 
Virginia for the identical doctrines have been- enunciated 
very recently by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Panama Refining Co. vi Ryan,, 293 U. S. 388; 79 L. Ed. 446 
(The hot ail case), and in Schecter Poultry Corp. v. U. 8., 
295 U.S. 495, 79 L. Ed.11570 (the "sick chicken''. or N. R. A. 
Case). In both of these cases the Supreme Court of the 
· United States held acts of Congress to be unconstitutional 
on the ground that attempted delegations of power by Con-
gress to the elcutive :violated the constitutional principles 
here asserted. I 
Upon exami ation o~ the Virginia Beverage Control Act, 
we find two sections which may be pertinent-
(1) Section 5, of Chapter 255, of the Acts of 1936, and 
(2) Section 49-a of Chapter 255 of the Acts of 1936. 
11 • It is believed i to be significant that the original 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, Chapter 94 of the Acts 
of 1934, contained no !inhibition against the transportation 
of alcoholic beverages legally aet]uired. The only provision 
oil the subject being found in Section 50 which provided that 
any person not a common carrier who should have, possess 
• • • or transport alcoholic beverages which are acquired by 
such person, or any person for whom he is acting, in viola-
tion of the provisions· :of the act shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor. 
J. T. Carter and E. P. Macemore v. Commonwealth. 9 
This Act of 1934, under Section 5 gave the Alcoholic Bev-
erage Control Board the right to make rules and reg'Ulations 
for carrying out. the provisions of the act. 
In 1936, the original act, which had been prepared by a 
group of eminent lawyers, was re-enacted with certain changes 
in phraseology and additions, among which was the addition 
of Section 49-a, which makes it a misdemeanor to transport 
alcoholic beverages in violation of rules and regulations of 
the Board. 
As it is conceded in this case that the liquor transported 
was leg·ally acquired, Section 5 can have no application and 
the disposition of the case must be governed by Section 49-a 
of. the act of 1936. 1Ve here quote the relevant provisions 
of this section which is now carried in l\fichie 's Code as Sec-
tion 4675 ( 49-2) : 
. "The transportation of alcoholic beverages other than 
wine * * * within, into- or through the State of Virginia in 
quantities in excess of one gallon is prohibited ~xcept in ac-
cordance with regulations adopted by the Virginia Alcoholic 
· Beverag·e Board pursuant to this section. 
12* *"The Bpard may adopt such regulations governing 
the transportation of alcoholic beverages * * • within, 
into or through the State of Virginia in quantities in excess 
of one gallon, as it may deem necessary to confine such trans-
portation to leg·itimate purposes and may issue transporta-
tion permits in accordance with such reg'Ulations. 
'' Any person who shall transport alcoholic beverages * • * 
in excess of one gallon in violation of such reg'Ulations shall 
be g'Uilty of a misdemeanor and punished as provided in Sec-
tion 62 of this act. '\ 
As this is the seciion of the act which prohibits the transpor-
tation of alcoholic beverages tbroug·h Virginia, whether said 
beverage was acquired leg·ally or illegally it is apparent that 
here the case a~;ainst the defendants must rest. And this 
is recognized in the warrant for the charge in that they "did 
unlawfully violate the provisions of Section 49-a of the Al-
c6holic Beverage Control Act of Virgi11ia and Sect.ions 42 
and 44 of a regulation of the "'Virginia Alcoholic Beverage 
. Control Board, known as Order No. A-1, adopted August 30, 
1940 :-In that they did * * * ", etc. 
Under Section 49-a the transportation is prohibited "ex-
. cept in accordance with reg11lations adopted by the Virginia 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, pursuant to this section". 
So it is to this section and this1 section only tpat we must look 
I 
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for the legislative grant of authority to make rules and regu-
lations which these defendants are charged with violating. 
We then come to th~ gist of the matter-the validity of 
this provision. 
'' The board may adopt such regulations governing the 
transportation of alcoh:olic beverages * ,K, * within, into and 
through Virginia in quantities in excess of one gallon as it 
may deem ,necessa.ry to confine such transportation to 
13* legitiniate purposb •and may issue transportation per-
mits in accordance with such regulations.'' When this 
provision is meas:ured I by the standards laid down by this 
court as hereinbefote indicated it would seem to be fatally 
defective. There is no uestion o be determined b 
the adminis rative o·enc t iere is no exercise of 1scre 10n 
as o e a1 s with which the leg1 r nug e unable to 
§uaint itself, there ii:; no clearly defined, legislative policy 
enunciated. Intoxicating liquor may only be transported in 
accordance with rules ivhich the board "may deem necessary 
to confine such transpqrta.tton to legitimate purposes". Who 
can say what a boarq. ''may deem necessary"? How far 
c.an the board go? Shall this board be permitted to adopt 
the most ridiculous regulations and when questioned reply-
"We deemed it necessary~ We have been given unrestricted 
and untrammeled discretion and we have exercised it. We 
are trying to confine this transportation to 'legitimate pur-
poses'." I . 
Then, who is to say what are legitimate purposes? There 
is probably no subject upon which there is more disagree-
ment than that of legiti.niate purpose when that term is ap- , 
plied to into;icating beverages. It is worthy of note that 
the act does not use the customary terms such as "lawful" 
or "purposes permitte1d by law", but the vague and indefinite 
word-' 'legitimate''. And if the Board deemed the rule neces-
sary to confine transportation to legitimate purposes it may 
adopt it and one who !violates that rule is guilty of a crime, 
and yet-
"It is a f'lt/ndament 1al princivle of our systmn of _qovern-
1nent that the ri_qhts of men are to be determined by the 
14* l(l!w itself, and t16t by the let or leave of *administrative 
. officer.'; or bureau.s. This vrinciple O'U.(Jht not tQ be sur-
re'J!.dered for convenierlCe or in effect nullified for the sake of 
expediency.'' 1 
(Justice Epes in Thompson v. 8mith, supra, and with ap-
proval by Chief Justice -Campbell in Assaid v. Roanoke, 
supra.) 1 
J. T. Carter and E. P. Macemore v. Commonwealth. 11 
'' The legality of the ordinance is to be tested not by what 
has been dotie under it, bitt by what may, by its a·uthority, be 
done.'' , 
{Chief Justice Campbell, in Assaid v. Roanoke,. supr~,J 
Of course, if the section of· the statute is invalid the rules 
adopted pursuant thereto must fall and these defendant's have 
violated no valid law of Virginia. ' 
II. 
Are the rules and regulations prormtlga.ted by the· Alco-
holic Bevera_ge Control Board proper and valid expressions 
of the authortiy ·pitrported to be granted under ·the Acts of 
.Assembly? 
The ruleij with which these defendants are charged with 
violating are known as Sections 42 and 44 of Order No . .A.-1 
adopted August 30, , 1940. These rules may be briefly Sum-
marized as follows: 
.Any person transporting alcoholic beverages within, into 
or through the State of Vfrginia shall- · · 
(1) Post with the Board a bond with approved .surety' in 
the penalty of $1,000, upon condition that such person will 
not unlawfully transport or deliver alcoholic beverages 
15* within, *into or through the State of Virginia, and evi-
dence that the. bond has been g·iven must accompany 
the beverages during transportation. _· 
(2) The beverages must be· accompanied by J;t bill of lad-
ing. or other memorandum of shipment signed by the con-
signor. showing the description of the beverages, the name 
and address of the consig110r, the name and address of the 
consignee, the route to be traveled bv such vehicle in Vir-
ginia, and such route must be the most direct route from the 
consignor's place of business to the place of business of the 
consignee. 
( 3) Vehicles transporting alcoholic beverages shall not 
vary from the rout~ specified in the bi_ll of lading or other 
memorandum of shipment. · 
( 4) The name of the consignor shall be the name of the 
true consignor and such consignor shall only be a person who 
has a legal rh~·ht to make such shipment. The name of the 
consignee shall be the name of the true consignee who has 
previously authorized in writing the shipment of the bev- · 
- I 
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erages and wµo has a legal right to receive 'such beverages at 
the point of destination .shown on the bill of lading. 
I 
The warrant in this case (R., p. 1), charges defendant 
with-(1) Failure to po~t the bond with approved surety as 
required by law; (2) Tnat the bill of lading· did not specify 
the route to be traveled[ in Virginia; and (3) The consignee 
shown on the bill of lading was a person who did not have a 
leg·al right to receive such alcoholic beverages at the point 
of destination. · 1 
If we assume that Sections 5 and 49-a of the Act are con-
stitutional and valid in levery respect and that the Board is 
thereby clothed with the authority to make regulations 
16* affecting ""the traµsportation of alcoholic beverages 
through the State, it is, nevertheless, proper to examine 
and scrutin~e the rules and regulations -of the Board made 
pursuant thereto in . order to ascertain whether or not the 
promulgation of such rules constitutes a .valid exercise of 
the powers granted to the Board under said statutes. Such 
rules are unauthorized if they were not contemplated by the 
Legislature in the enactment of the statutes, and unless the 
power to make them WfS expressly or by necessary implica-
tion under the language of the statutes delegated to the 
Board they are void and invalid. 
In all cases the rulesl and regulations may be tested in the · 
courts to determine whether they are directed to the accom-
plishment of the purp6ses of the Statute under which they 
are made, and the regulati~ns may not extend the statute or 
modify its provisions. I (See l.1 American Jurisprudence 958, 
and cases cited.) -
In construing the 18.Ilguage of the statutes containing dele-
gation power to public officers or administrative agencies, 
the general rule seems fO be that the statutes are to be strictly 
construed against the delegation of such power and any doubt-
ful or uncertain l~n~age must, of course, be construed 
against the delegation !of power. As was said in the case of 
Central Union Telep1z
1
one Com.pany, et al., v. Indianapolis 
.Telephone Crnnpan11, an Indiana case, 126 N. E. 628, "all 
doubtful languag·e in ,statutes deleg·ating authority will be 
construed in favor o:fi the' retention of such power by the 
LeJ1:islature. '' 
(
17* *Under these :criteria let us car~..fully examine the · 
languag·e of the .Alcoholic Beverage Control Act as a 
whole in or~er that we maY: determine what regulatory pow-
ers the Leg-1slature ther.eby mtended to delegate to the Board 
and, especially, the lif itations of such power, if any wer; 
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intended. Let us inquire as to what kind of regulations the 
Legislature intended the Board to promulgate pursuant to 
the Act. 
In the title of the Act its purpose is defined to "legalize, 
regulate and control the manufacture, bottling, sale, distri-
bution, transportation, handling; advertising, possession, 
drinking and use of alcohol. • • • '' 
Section 5 provides that all regulations of the Board must 
be reasonable~ and not inconsistent 1with the Act itself or the 
general laws of the State.\ Section 49-a, applying specifically 
to regulations of transp~tation of alcoholic beverag·es, pro-
vides that the ,Board may make regulations "as it may deem 
• necessary to confine such transportation to legitimate pur-
·poses' '. In no other section of the Act is there any provision 
affecting the transportation of alcoholic beverages through 
the State. All other sections of the Act deal with the regu-
lation, superv1s1on and control of the manufacture, distrib; .. 
tion and consumption of alcoholic beverages within the State. 
There can be no doubt that the Legislature intended ilia · 
the transportation of alcoholic beverages through the State 
should be regulated and controlled insofar that such trans-
portation might result in violations of the laws of Vir-
18* ginia. It was not *strictly necessary to enact any stat-
ute to accomplish such purpose. The mere fact that a 
citizen of North Carolina or any other state is engaged in 
transporting whiskey or any other article from one state to 
another through the State of Virginia does not in any case 
absolve him from obeying all of the laws of Virginia. He 
must obey all speed and other traffic reg'Ulations; he cannot 
violate any provision of the Alcoholic Beverage ·Control Act 
as to the illegal sale, distribution, possession or consump..: 
tion of alcoholic beverages while within the boundaries of 
Virginia; and, in short, he has no privileges, rights or im-
munities other than those accorded to our own citizens. There' 
is no languag·e contained in the entire. Act indicating any in-
tention on the pa.rt of the Legislature to .enforce the laws of 
North. Carolin~,- or any other Rtate other than those of Vir-
ginia, nor can the language of the Act be construed· to in-
tend that tl1e time and efforts of the State Officers and em-
ployees and the State's money be expend~d in ascertaining 
what the laws of other states may be and whether or not 
· they might be violated by a person transporting alcoholic 
beverages through this State before he enters the State or 
after he has departed from it. 
The sole intention of the Legislature was obviously to 
g·uard against the violation of the Virginia law by interstate 
transporters of alcoholic beverages while within the bound-
I . 
I 
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aries of the State. They had in mind that the operators of. 
trucks containing· ship:r;nents of a~coholi~ beverages on. their 
journey through the State might violate our laws 1f not 
19s properlv supervised and *policed while within the State 
· and to guard against such violations they attempted to 
delegate to ~he Board purely administrative functions of po-
licing such interstate shipments. In order to facilitate such 
policing of these shipments while within the boundaries of 
the State the Legislators in the Act of 1934 empowered the 
Board to make rules and regulations governing the same pro-
vided suc-h rules should be reasonable and not inconsistent 
with the .Act itself. In' 1936 the Legislature added to the Act 
Section 49-a provi<;ling·; that the Board might make such regu-
lations as it might dee:m necessary to confine such transpor-
tation to leg·itimate purposes. Any rule or regulation for 
any other purpose than the policing of such shipments would 
plainly be unauthoriz~d, because it would not be consistent 
"with the Act itself". The term ''legitimate purposes" con-
tained in Section 49-a could not logically be ·construed to 
mean anything other fthan purposes lawful under the laws 
of the State of Virginia. 
The provisions in ~ection 49-a that the Board may make 
such regulations as it :may .deem "necessary" even if we as-
sume that the delegation of power is constitutional, could 
not be construed to mean that there is no limitation what-
ever upon the power, tiecause an attempted deleg·ation of this 
nature is plainly unconstitutional. Such language must be 
construed in connection with Section 5 to mean that the Board 
may make regulations reasonably designed to police inter-
state shipments while within the bolmdaries of the State. 
Any rule or regulatiqn promulg·ated by the Board not so 
designed for such purpose would be unauthorized. 
Disregarding all questions as to whether or not 
20* *such rules and !regulations are in violation of Article 
I of the Constitution of the United States as placing an 
undue burden upon interstate commerce let us examine the 
reg·ulations in questiort to ascertain whether or not they were 
expressly or impliedly delegated and authorized by the Act. 
Applying· the above tests we shall deal with the Reg-ula-
tions in the order set forth above. · 
(1) The requireme1i1t of a bond ,with approved sitrety be-
fore a person may transport goods through the State is, so 
far as we know, 1mprecedented. To require a person to give 
bond conditioned updn his compliance with laws before he 
is permitted to eng-ag-e in a lawful enterprise over which the 
State may have no absolute control is, to say the least, nn-
! 
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usual. The only purpose would he to assure his payment of 
a penalty in the event that he was found guilty of a viola-
tion of the' law or to convince the Board of his financial re-
sponsibility. It may be that the most trustworthy and law-
abiding persons would not be in a position to give the bond. 
The provision that the surety must be approved places in 
the Board the power to arbitrarily refuse any applicant the 
right to transport whiskey through. this State. 
Can it be said that this requirement is designed purely 
for the purpose of policing the shipment through the State? 
We think not. It would seem that the purpose is to grant or 
refuse the right to transport alcoholic beverages through the 
state at the will of the Board. 
21 * f:/sWe, therefore, submit that this regulation was not 
authorized under the .A.ct. 
' (2) Th~ requirements that the route of the shipment 
through the State be designated and that such route be the 
most direct from the consignor to the consignee seem to us 
t_o be. most unreasonable and arbitrary. 
To require one to anticipate the exact route he is to travel 
while in the State is most exacting. He might not know the 
condition of the roads. If he should be compelled to spend 
the night in Virginia could he leave the highway to go to a 
hotel not situated thereon 1 Suppose floods destroy a bridge 
after he has entered the State. Such a reg;ulation would re-
quire the carrier to anticipate the condition of every road 
over which he . must travel, and not vary therefrom under 
any circumstances, regardless of the exigencies which might 
arise whether foreseeable or not. 
· Had the regulation required notice to the Board or any 
other agency that this truck would travel over certam roads 
at certain times in order that the shipment might be in-
spected, or that the shipment be inspected and checked be-
fore it entered the State and at the time of departure,' they 
might be deemed reasonable exercises of the rule-making 
power. If the load were sealed prior to entering the State and 
inspected on departure, or any similar regulation to insure 
ag·ainst illegal distribution of the shipment in this St~fo, 
such a reg11lation might be reasonable and authorized under 
the Act. 
22* •The rules in question are not reasonably designed 
to properly accomplish the desi~n of the Legislature, 
but seemingly for the pure purpose of .burdening the carrier 
with inhibitions and useless restraints on bis journey through 
the State. 
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(3) The third particllar in which these d~fendants are 
charg·ed with the violation of the rules of the Alcoholic Bev-
erage Control Board i~ that the consignee of this ·whiskey 
in North Carolina, as shown on the bill of lading, was a per-
son who did not have a 1 legal right to receive such alcoholic 
beverage at the point o~ destination. It will be observed that. 
the rules require that the consignor must have a legal right 
. to make the shipment ~nd the consig·nee must have a legal 
right to receive the shipment at the point of destination. In 
other words, that the S
1
fate of Virg·inia will inquire into the 
laws of other States and if, under those laws, an illegal act 
has been or may be committed in those States, the State of 
Virginia will charge that a crime bas been committed against 
the laws of Virginia. ! Counsel can hardly conceive of a 
situation which would more dearly demonstrate the lengths 
to which the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board has gone in 
departing· from what i~ believed to be the true intent and 
purpose of the Virginia .Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. If 
this rule be valid the changing laws of any state in the Union 
to which alcoholic beverages may be consigned would be-
come an issue in the ttial of one charged with transporting 
such beverages th.rough Virginia. And not only would the 
law of the State of destination be in issue but the law of the 
particular conunrtnity, if there happened to be local 
23* option in that State, would be the test of *the commis-
sion of a crime in Virgfoia. The General Assembly of 
Virginia passes laws to; apply within the confines of the Com-
monwealth and for the Alcoholic Beverage ·Control Board to 
say that these defendants, who have violated no law of the 
State of Virginia, arel guilty of a crime punishable in the 
·Courts of Virginia because they will deliver whiskey to some 
person outside of the State of Virginia who is not legally au-
thorized to receive that whiskey at the· point of destination 
again forcibly illustrates the unsoundness of these regula-
tions. To uphold and enforce such a regulation would re-
quire a complete abnegation of the General Assembly of Vir-
. ginia from its lawful prerogative to make laws for Virginia 
and to surrender that prerogative to the Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Board who, in turn, surrender it to the Leg·islature 
of some foreign state I or, forsooth, to the law-making body 
of some county or hamlet to which a shipment of whiskey 
might be destined. 
1 
It is confidently submitted that in these respects these peti-
tioners have violated ho valid law of the State of Virginia. 
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III. 
Are the rules and regulations vroniulgated by the Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Board violative of .Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 3 of the Constitittion of the United States in that they 
impose a bitrden ·upon interstate cmnmerce? 
Counsel have been careful in the discussion hereinbefore 
set out to refrain from any reference to the interstate 
· 24* *commerce feature of this case, and irrespective of the 
view of the Court on the matters hereinbefore presented, 
it is confidently submitted that the regulations which these 
defendants are charged with violating are unconstitutional 
and invalid as constituting direct burdens on interstate com-
merce. 
The first charg·e is the failure of these defendants to post 
bond as required by the rules. This question was directly 
passed on by this Court in the recent case of W illimns v. 
Commonwealth, 169 Va. 857, where the Court, speaking 
through Mr. Justice Gregory, said-
"The provisions of the statute (Code, Section 4675· (49a)) 
requiring· transportation permits and the' posting of a bond 
for interstate shipments of liquor, not to be delivered or used 
in Virginia, but only passing through the State in interstate 
commerce, destined for some other State, constitute direct 
burdens upon interstate commerce and are to that extent in-
valid. The failure of the plaintiff in error to have a trans-
portation permit for his shipment and his failure to post the 
bond required did not constitute an infraction of any valid 
criminal law of the Commonwealth.'' 
It is submitted that this pronouncement of the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia is still the law of the Commonwealth. 
The second charge against these defendants is tha.t the 
bill of lading of the shipment did not specify the route to be 
traveled in Virg'inia. 
This question was directly passed on by this Court in the 
recent case of Surles v. C01nm.onwealth, 172 Va. 573, where 
the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holt, said-
" The Williams case holds that transportation permits and 
the exaction of bonds in interstate shipments are burdens 
which the State cannot impose. And for the same reason 
a designation in advance of the route to be traveled is au 
exercise of power forbidden to the State.'' 
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258 *It is submitted that this pronouncement of the Su-
preme Court of .Aippeals of Virginia is still the law of 
the Commonwealth. 
There can be no doU!bt' that had thi~ Court in the Surles 
and Williams cases, both sup1·a, had before it the third regu-
lation requiring a lawf:ul consig·nor and consignee, it would 
have held the third reg;ulation to be invalid -and unconstitu-
tional for the same ·reasons given in the opinions as to the 
-validity of the regulations there in question. Surely there 
can be no question that 'the requirements of lawful consignors 
and consignees outside i the boundaries of Virginia would fall 
into the same category with the rules there considered-to 
constitute a regulation of or a burden· upon interstate com-
1nerce. I · 
However, we anticipate that counsel for the defendants in 
error will seek comfort in the recent case decided by the Su-
preme Court of the United States, Duckworth v. State of 
Arkansas, 62 .S. Ct. 311, 86 L. Ed. 261, wherein the constitu-
tionality of an Act of the Arkansas Legislature was attacked 
as unconstitutional. The Act required a permit to be ob-
tained for the transportation of intoxicating liquors through 
the State. The court held that the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution of th@ United States did not preclude a State 
from prescribing reasonable requirements governing such a · 
transportation in ordet to insure that the liquor will not be 
diverted to delivery or use within the State. The Supreme 
Court was careful to limit the application of its opinion to a 
permit such as it had before it, saying: 
26* "'' * * * The 111·esent 1·equ·irement of a permit is not 
shown to be more than a means of establishing the iden-
tity of those ivho are engaged 1in the' transportation, their 
route and point of destination, and affords· opportunity for 
local officials to take i appropriate measures to insure that 
the liquor is transported without diversion, in conformity to 
the permit. * e * The .t\rkansas statute does not conflict with 
any act of Congress. It does 1not forbid or preclude the trans-
portation, or inter/ ere with the free flow of commerce among 
the states bevond wha(, is reasona,blJJ necessary to protect the 
local public i'l'tterest in preventin_q unlawful distribittion or 
use of liquor within the .c;tate. • * * 
"What we have said is restricted to the statute as applied 
under the regulations in force at the time of petitioner's al-
leged pffense. It willj be time enough to deal with abuses of 
the permit system if :and when they arise. * @ * '' (Italics 
ours.) 
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How would the United States Supreme Court have ,de-
cided the Williams and Surles cases, both su,pra? Could the 
court have said that the requirements of a bond with ap-
proved surety, an unchangeable itinerary routed on the bill 
of lading, and, according to the determination of an admin-
istrative board, a consignor and consignee lawfully entitled 
to transmit and receive the shipment without the boundaries 
of the State, were '' reasonably necessary to protect the local 
public interest in preventing unlawful distribution or use of 
liquor within the State''? "\Ve think not. We do not believe 
that such regulations can be so construed, and we earnestly 
submit that the said regulations create an unauthorized bur-
den upon interstate commeroo and if enforced against the · 
· petitioners constitute a violation of their rights under the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States. 
IV. 
Was the cancellation of the bond of H ealton Miller by the 
.Alcoholic Beverage Control Board a valid act under the 
27* *power and authority conferred by the .Alcoholic Bev-
erage a ontrol .Act or the R1tles and Regulations of the 
Board made pursuant thereto? 
Assuming that the Act may have legally authorized the 
Board to make some kinds of rules and regulations affecting 
·the mode and manner of transportation of interstate ship-
ments of intoxicating liquors, there could certainly be no 
right conferred to act arbitrarily and without the promulga-
tion of a_ny rule, or regulation governing such act. , 
There is no expr~ss authority contained in the Act or the 
Regulations made by the Board authorizing it to cancel a 
bond once it has been properly posted and. approved. 
Can such power be· implied from the Act or the Regula-
tions? If so, the Board has the power to deny the rig·ht to 
transport liquor through this State to any person upon its 
whim or caprice. Any rumors which it m1ght hear concem-
-ing a man's character or reputation might give it an excuse 
to cancel the bond. It would appear that the members of 
the Board acknowledge no limitation of the power. They 
could cancel the bond because of race, creed or color or any 
other reason. This court in Assaid v. Roanoke, siepra, de- · 
cided that such power could not be delegated by the Legis-
lative authority even if such were the intention. 
We, therefore. submit that there was no power, either ex-
press or implied, vested in the Board to cancel the bond of 
Healton Miller, and that at the time of petitioners; arrest 
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the bond was in full f orbe and · effect. Consequently there 
was no violation of the Regulations of the Board in this re-
spect. 
2s• 
Was the cancellation ofi the bond a violation of pe.titioners~ 
rights under the Commerce Ola11,se of the Constitution of the 
United States 'I · 
· It must be remembereJ that petitioners are not in the same 
position as producers, distributors and consumers of alco-
holic beverages in Yirgiµia. Their transportation of alco-
holic beverages through the State is not a privilege existing 
as a result of a license or grant on the part of thA State, but 
is an absolute right guaranteed and protected by the Con-
stitution of the United S~ates. Even though Virginia might 
prohibit the consumption or possession of liquor within its 
jurisdiction, yet it could not prohibit its transportation 
through the State. 1 
There was no question as to the financial status of the 
corporate surety on the bond in this case. There was no as-
sertion that the principal of the bond or his agents had ever 
violated the laws of Vi!rginia or intended to do so in the 
future. The only reason given for the cancellation of the 
bond was that the principal had the reputation of being a 
bootlegger in North Ca~olina, and this without any hearing 
or notice to him. · 
"The cancellation of the. bond operated to prohibit any trans-
portation of alcoholic beverages through the State by Heal-
ton Miller or his agentsJ and we submit that this act on the 
part of the Board violated his constitutional rights under 
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United 
States. I • 
29• •dONCLUSION. 
I 
It is submitted therefore that the judgment of the Trial 
Court was contrary to the law and the evidence and that 
these defendants have vtolated no valid law of the Common-
wealth of Virginia. , 
Therefore, petitioners pray that a writ of error and s,z1,per-
sedeas be awarded to them, that the aforesaid judgment of 
the Circuit Court of Rappahannock County be reversed and 
annulJed,. and that appropriate .action be taken leading to 
the d1sm1ssal of the ch~rges against these defendants. 
I 
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. N qtice that Oounsel for Petitioners will present this peti-
tion, with the record attached, to Hon. George L. Browning, 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, at his office in the City of Richmond, _on the 13th day 
of October, 1942, at two o'clock, has been g·iven to Hon. George 
H. Davis, Jr., Commonwealth's Attorney for the County of 
Rappahannock, as evidenced by his acceptance thereof ap-
pended hereto. · 
In the event of a writ of error is granted, this petition will 
he adopted as a brief for the Plaintiffs in Error. 
And Petitioners will ever pray, etc. 
JOHN THOMAS CARTER, 
EUGEl~CE PEARSON M.&CEMORE, 
By Counsel. 
WEA VER, ARMSTRONG & MARSHALL, 
PERKLNS, BATTLE & MINOR, 
p. q. 
30* *We, Aubrey G. Weaver and John S. Battle, the un-
dersigned attorneys-at-law, practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that, in our 
opinion, the judg·ments referred to in the foregoinif petition 
should be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia. 
AUBREY G.- WE.A.VER, 
JOHN S. BATTLE .. 
31* "''I hereby accept full, due and timely notice of the 
presentation of the foreg·oing petition, a true copy. of 
which has been delivered to me, to Honorable George L. 
Browning, .Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia, at his office in the City of Richmond on 
the 13th day of October, 1942, at two o'clock P. M. 
GEORGE H. DAVIS, JR., 
Attorney for the Commonwealth for the 
. County of Rappahannock, Virginia. 
Received October 14, 1942·. 
G.L. B. 
October 15, 1942. Writ of error and sitpersedeas awarded 
by the Court. Bond $200. 
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* APPENDIX. 
Section 5 of Alcoholfo Beverage Control A.ct of 1936 
Michie 's .Code- I 
1 
'' Section 4675 ( 5). Power to make regulations; how pub-
lished; effect there'of.-(a) The board may from time to time 
make such reasonable regulations, not inconsistent with this 
act, nor the general laws: of the State, as the board shall deem 
necessary to carry out the purposes, and provisions of this 
act and to prevent the illegal manufacture, bottling, sale, dis-
tribution and transportation of alcoholic beverages, or any 
one or more of such illegal acts and from time to time alter, 
repeal, or amend such :regulations or any of them. Such 
regulations sha~l be published . at least once in some news-
paper published in the !city of Richmond and in any other 
manner which the board may deem advisable, and upon being 
so published shall have the force and effect of law. The board 
shall certify to the clerks of all circuit courts and city courts 
of record having· criminal jurisdiction copies of all regula-
tions adopted by the boJrd; such clerks shall keep on file. for 
public inspection all such regulations certified to them by 
the board. · 
'' (b) 'Nothing in this act contained shall require such regu-
lations to be uniform in their application. 
'' ( c) Justices and co11rts shall take judicial notice of the 
regulations of the board made, published and filed in accord-· 
ance with the provisions of this act. (Id., p. 105·; 1936, p. 
419.)" 
Section 49-a of Alcoholic Beverage Control Act of 1936 
Michie 's Code- ! 
"Section 4675 ( 49a). .Transportation; transporta.tion per-
m.its; penalties.---:The transportation of alcoholie beverages,. 
other than wine and beer, purchased from persons licensed 
to sell same in this State, and those alcoholic beverages which 
may be manufactured and sold without any license under the 
provisions of this act, within, into or through the State of 
Virginia, in quantities in excess of one gallon is prohibited 
e~c~pt in acc?rdance ,~ith regulations adopted by the Vir-
gm1a Alcoholic Beverage Control Board pursuant· to this 
section. ' 
33* *'' The board may adopt such regulations governing 
the transportation of alcoholic beverages, other than 
wine and b~er purchas~d from persons licensed to sell sall!e 
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in this State and those alcoholic beverages which may be 
manufactured and sold without any license under the pro-
visions of this act within, into or through Virginia in quan-
tities in excess of one gallon, as it may deem necessary to 
confine such transportation to legitimate purposes and may 
issue transportation permits in accordance with such regu-
lations. · 
".Any person who shall-transport alcoholic beverages other 
than wine and beer purchased from persons licensed to sell 
the same in this State and those alcoholic beverages which 
may be manufactured and sold without any license under the 
provisions of this act, in excess of one gallon, in violation of 
such regulations shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and pun-
ished as provided in section 4675(62). (1936, p. 434.)" 
Regulations of Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, Sec-
tion 42-
, 'Section 42. The Transportation of Alcoholic Bever-
ages as Defined in the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Act, As Amended, :within, Into, or Throug·h the State of 
Virginia in Quantities in Excess of One Gallon. 
''Before any person shall transport any alcoholic bever-
ages within, into or through the State of Virginia, such per-
son shall post with the Virginia .Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Board a bond with approved surety, payable to the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, in the penalty of One Thousand Dol-
lars, upon condition that such person will not unlawfully 
transport and/or deliver any alcoholic beverages within, into, 
or through the State of Virginia, and evidence that the re-
quired bond has been posted shall accompany the alcoholic 
heverages at all times during transportation. 
"Provided, however, that no such bond shall be required 
of any person licensed under the Virginia Alcoholic Bever-
age Control Act, as amended, to sell alcoholic beverages when 
such alcoholic beverages are being transported in a vehicle 
belonging· to the licensee. 
''Provided further that no such bond shall be required of 
any person transporting wine and/or beer purchased from 
persons licensed under the provisions of the Virginia 
34 * Alcoholic *Beverage Control .Act, as amended, or those 
alcoholic beverages which may be manufactured and sold 
without any license under the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Act, as amended.'' 
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Regulations of Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, Sec-
tion 44--
, 'Section 44. Where alcoholic beverages are desired to be 
transported within, into, or through the State of Virginia 
( except those instances mentioned in Sections 42 ru1d 43 of 
these Regulations), such transportation shall be engaged in 
only when in accordance with the provisions of these regula-
tions: I 
"(a) There shall accompany such alcoholic beverages at 
all times during transportation, a bill of lading or other 
memorandum of shipment, signed by the consignor showing 
an exact description of the alcoholic beverages being trans-
ported, the name and address of the consignor; the name and 
address of the consignee; the route to be traveled by such 
vehicle while in Virginia and such route must be the most 
direct route from the consignor's place of business to the 
place of business of the consignee. 
'' (b) Vehicles transpdrting alcoholic beverages shall not 
vary from the route spehified in the bill of lading or other 
memorandum of shipment. 
" ( c) The name of the. consignor on any such bill of lading 
or other memorandum of shipment shall be the name of the 
true consignor of the alooholic beverages, being· transported, 
and such consignor shall only be a person who has a legal 
right to make such shipment. The name of the consig·nee on 
any such bill of lading or other memorandum of shipment 
shall be the name of the, true consignee of the alcoholic bev-
erages being transported, and who has previously authorized 
in writing the shipment of the alcoholic beverages being trans-
ported and who has a leg·al right to receive such alcoholic 
beverages at the point of destination shown on the bill of lad-
ing or other memorandum of shipment.'' 
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RECORD 
-CRIMINAL WARRA-l~T. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia: 
County of Rappahannock, to-wit: 
. 
To Any Polle~ Officer, Greeting : 
WHERE,AS, J. W. Dulaney, A B C Investigator has this 
day made complaint and information on oath before me, the 
undersigned, M. A. Compton, eJustice for the County of :Etap-
pahannock that John Thomas Carter & Eugene Pearson 
Mac~more, heretofore, to-wit: on the 20th day of May, 1942, 
within the said County of Rappahannock, did unlawfully vio-
late the provisio·ns of Section 49-a of the Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Act of Virginia, and Section 42 and 44 of a regula-
tion of the Virginia Alcoholic Beverag·e Control Board, known 
as Order No. A-1, adopted August 30, 1940: In that you 
did transport more than one gallon of alcoholic beverages, 
namely: 56 cases, containing 168 gallons of whiskey, from 
a point in the State of Maryland, within and into the State 
· of Virginia and in Rappahannock County, Virginia., without 
having posted with the Virginia Alcoholic B'everage Control 
Board a bond with approved surety, as required by law; and 
Further, that the bill· of lading or other memorandum 0£ 
shipment did not specify the route to be traveled by such 
vehicle while in Virginia; and 
Further, the consignee shown on the bill of lading or other 
memorandum of shipment was a person who did not 
page 2 } have a legal right to receive such alcoholic bever-
ages at the point of destination shown on the bill 
of lading or other memorandum of shipment,. namely; R. M. 
""Williard, T / A Eagle Distilling Company, Route 1, Thomas-
ville, North Carolina, against the peace and dignity of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia. 
THESE AR,E THEREFORE, in the name of the Com-
monwealth, to command you forthwith to aprehend and bring 
before the Trial Justice of the said County of Rappahan-
nock, the said John Thomas Carter and Eugene Pearson 
l\facemore to answer the said complaint and to be further 
dealt with according to law. 
And you are further required to summon R. E. Wood, J. 
M. Lillard, ,J. W. Dulaney and E. C. Hoberoft to appear at 
26 · Supreme cJrt of Appeals of' Virginia 
the same time and place and give evidence on the trial or ex-
amination of this warra!nt! . 
Given under my hand kd seal this the 25 day of May, 1942. 
M. A. CO!fPTON, J. P. (Seal) 
I 
· JUDGMENT OF THE TRJ.AL JUSTICE·. 
• ! • I 
The above named .Tohn Thomas Carter & Eugene Pearson 
Macemore were this dayi ,brought before me in the Trial J us-
tice Court of Rappahannock County, and the above warrant 
was tried by me in the presence of said accused, upon their 
plea of not guilty, and iUs my judgment that the sai.d defend-
ants are guilty of the within charges and I fix their punish-
ment at a fine of Fifty [Dollars and costs. Said defengants 
agreed to be tried jointly. 
And thereupon the said accused was let on Bail. 
Given under my hand this the 6th day of June, 1942. 
! 
GEO. W. SETTLE, 
Trial Justice. 
page 3 ~ APPEAL TO CIRCUIT COURT. 
~ I , 
On motion of the said Defendants an appeal is allowed to 
them from within judgment to the Circuit Court of Rappa-
hannock Co. and they were thereupon let to 1Bail. 
Given under my hand: this the 6th day of June, 1942. 
I 
i 
GEO. W. SETTLE, 
Trial Justice. 
BAIL BOND. 
Commonwealth of Virginia: 
County of Rappahanpock, to-wit: 
I 
I, Geo. W. Settle, T. J. for said County of Rappk., Vir-
ginia do hereby certify that John Thomas -Carter & Eugene 
Pearson Macemore haV"e this day acknowledged themselves 
indebted to the Commbnwealth of Virginia in the sum of 
Two Hundred Dollars 1 ($200.00), of their respective goods 
and chattels, lands and tenements to be made and· levied: and 
do hereby post in the hands of ,J as. M. Settle, Clerk of Cir-
cuit Couit the sum of ~20Q.OO in cash ~s additional security. 
Yet upon this condition that if the said John Thomas Car-
ter & Eugene Pearson :h~acemore shall personally appear 
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before the Circuit Court of the County of Rappahannock 
Virginia, on the 13th day of July, 1942., then and there to 
answer the Commonwealth concerning· said charge in this 
warrant., and shall not depart thence without leave of said 
Court., then this recognizance to be void; otherwise, to re-
main in full force and virtue. 




page 4 }- Given under my hand and seal this 6th day of 
June, 1942. 
GEO. W. SETTLE (Seal) 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. Warrant for 
John Thomas Carter, Eugene Pearson l\facemore. 
RETURN OF OFFICER. 
• I executed the within warrant by arresting the within named 
John T. -Carter & Eugene P. Macemore on the 6th day of 
June, 1942. 
J. M. LILLARD, Sheriff. 
Costs in Trial Justice Court 
Fine ................................. $50.00 
Warrant fee J.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.00 
Trial Fee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.00 
Executing Warrant, Sheriff . . . . . . . . . . . 2.00 
Commonwealth Attorney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.00 
Mileag·e Fee J. W. Dulaney. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.80 
Bail Fee-Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 2.00 
Search ,varrant Fee Sheriff . . . . . . . . . . 1.00 
Jail Fee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.001 
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.80 
• Clerk's Fee . . . . ................... ·. . . 1.25 
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72.05 
28 
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· Search Warrant J. P. . . . . . . . . 1.00 
page 5 ~ . Ba~l Bond-Co. i . . ...... ~ . . . . . . 1.00 
· Bail Bond J. M. 1, Settle . . . . . . . . . 2.00 
Total . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78.05 
I 
Virginia: I 
In the Trial Justice Court of the County of Rappahannock. 
Commonwealth of Vir~a 
1J. 
John Thomas Carter and Eugene Pearson Macemore .. 
. ! ORDER. 
1 On this 6th day of Jnrl.e, 1942, the above case having been 
heard and the bail bond £qr the appearance of the defendants 
before the Circuit Court' of Rappahannock County, Virginia, 
on the 13th day of July, 1942, having been set in the pen-
alty of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00), it is ordered that 
· J. M. Settle, Clerk of the Circuit Court · of Rappahannock 
C9unty, do pay over to the said defendants the sum of ,One 
Thousand Four Hundred. Dollars, ($1,400), held by him as 
collateral for the bail qonds returnable this day, retaining 
the sum of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) as collateral for 
the bonds. issued this day as aforesaid. 
Enter: 
I 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
GEO. W. SETTLE, 
Trial Justice. 
·County of Rappahannock, to-wit: 
KNOW ALL. MEiN BiY° THESE PRESENT That I John 
T. Carter am held and.firmly bound under the Commonwealth• 
of Virginia in the just and full sum of Eight Hun-
page 6 ~ dred Dollars ($800.00) to the payment whereof well 
and truly to be. made I bind myself, my heirs and 
personal representatives, fii·mly by these presents; and as 
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of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Rappahannock County, 
Virginia, the sum of Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00) in cash, 
to be forfeited to the Commonwealth or returned upon the 
conditions hereinafter stated: 
.And I hereby waive the benefit of my homestead exemption 
as to this obligation. 
Sealed with my seal and dated this 22nd day of May, 1942. 
The condition of the above obligation is such that if the 
above bound John T. Carter shall personally appear before 
the Trial Justice Court of said County on the 6th day of 
June, 1942, as well as at any other time or times to which 
the proceedings 4i connection with the charge herein speci-
fied may be continued or further heard, then and there an-
swer to the Commonwealth of Virginia, for and concerning 
a certain crime by him committed as described in the war-
rant hereto attached and shall not depart thence without 
leave of said Court, this his recognizance to remain in full 
force· and effect until said eharg·e shall have been :finally dis· 
posed of or until it shall have been declared void by order 
of a Court of competent jurisdiction, then this obligation 
shall be void; otherwise to remain in full force and effect. 
JOHN T. CARTER Seal 
Signed, sealed and acknowledged by each of the above 
named, obligors before me, at the Clerk's Office of 
page 7 ~ said County, this 22nd day 0£ May, 1942. 
,T AS. M. SETTLE, 
Clerk Ct. Ct. Rapp 'k. C~., Va. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
County of Rappahannock, to-wit: 
Know all men by these present, that I Eugene Pearson 
Macemore, principal, and John T. Carter, surety, are held 
and firmly bound unto the Commonwealth of Virginia in the 
just and full sum of Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00) to th.e 
payment whereof well and truly to be made we bind our-
selves, our heirs and personal representatives, jointly and 
severally, firmly by these present; and as additional securitv 
for this bond do hereby post in the hands 0£ the Clerk of 
the Circuit Court of Rappahannock County, Virginia, the 
sum of $800.00 cash, to be forfeited to the Commonwealth.or 
returned upon the condition hereinafter stated. .And we 
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hereby waiye the benefit! of our homestead exemptions as to 
this obligation. 1 
Sealed with our seals and dated this 21st day of May, 
1942. 
The condition of the above obligation is such that if the 
above bound Eugene Pearson Macemore shall personally ap-
pear before the Trial Justice Court of said County on the 
6th day of June, 1942, als well as at any other time or times 
to which the proceedings in connection with the charge 
herein specified may be continued or further heard, then and 
there answer to the Commonwealth of Virginia, for and con-
cerning a certain crime by him committed as described in the 
warrant herefo attached and shall not depart thence with-
out leave of said Court, this his recognizance to re-
page 8 ~ main in full f o~ce and effect until said charge shall 
have been :finaJlly disposed of or until it shall have 
' been declared void by drder of a Court of competent juris-
diction, then this obligation shall be void; otherwise to re-
main in full force and effect. · 
EUGENE MA.,CE:MORE 
JOHN T. CARTER 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
Signed, sealed and acknowledged by each of the above 
named obligors before me, at the Clerk's Office of said County, 
this 21st day of May, 1942. , 
Virginia: 
B. M. MILLER, 
Subt. T. J. 
In the Circuit Court 'of Rappahannock County. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
11. . I . 
John Thomas Carter and Eugene Pearson Macemore. 
On this 13th day of July, 1942, came the said John Thomas 
Carter and Eugene Pearson 1'.facemore by their attorneys 
and George H. Davis, Jr., who prosecutes for the Common~ 
wealth in this behalf; and, 
Whereupon said defendants by their attorneys entered 
their pleas of not guilty to the charges contained in the war-
rant issued in this case. 
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Whereupon the said defendants by their said attorneys in 
open court waived trial by jury and filed a written 
page 9 } stipulation of the facts upon which the charges in 
said wa.rrant are based, which statement was sub-
scribed by the attorneys for the defendants and for the Com-
monwealth and it was agreed that the same shall constitute 
the facts in this case. 
WHEREUPON the Court took this case under advisement 
and granted leave to attorneys for both the Commonwealth 
and the defendants to file memorandum of authorities on the 
various issues involved in this case within 20 days from the 
date of this order.· 
And this case is continued. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Rappahannock County, September 
14th, 1942. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. 
John Thomas -Carter and Eugene Pearson l\facemore, De-
fendants. 
UPON AN APPEAL WARRANT. 
This day came again the Commonwealth by her attorney, 
and came also the defendants, by counsel; whereUJ?On the 
Court being now fully a~vised of its opinion in this case, 
doth adjudge and order that each of said defendants be fined 
the sum of $50.00 and the costs of this prosecution ; there-
upon the defendants, by counsel noted an exception to the 
ruling· of the court; it is further ordered that the bail in this 
case be continued in full force and effect. 
Virg·inia: 
In the Circuit Court of Rappahannock County. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. 
John Thomas ·Carter and Eug·ene Pearson M:acemore, De-
fendants. , 
[ . 
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page 10} I ORDE·R. 
I 
On this 28th day of September, 1942, came the defendants 
by their attorneys and !moved the ·Court for a stay of the 
execution of the judgment of the Court_ in. this case entered 
against the defendants 10n the ground that the defendants 
intend to apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
for a writ of error. And came also the Commonwealth by 
its attorney. I 
There being no objections or exceptions to said motion, 
the same is sustained and it is ordered that execution of the 
judgment against the defendants entered in this case on the 
14th day of SeptemberJ 1942, be and the same is hereby 
stayed for a period of' ninety days from the date of this 
order. 
The bail bond heretofore entered into by the defendants 
shall continue in full f 6rce and effect and the same is con-
tinued until the further order of this court. 
I J. R. H. ALEXANDER, Judge. 
Seen & Approved: , 
i 




In the Circuit C0urt of Rappahannock County. 
, ! . • 
C~mmonwealth of Virginia 
V. I 
John Thomas Carter and Eugene Thomas Macemore, De-
fendants. 
BILL !OF EXCEPTIONS. 
Be it remembered thi~.t on the trial of this case it was stipu-
lated betweep. the Commonwealth and the defend-
page 11 r ants that the facts of this case were as follows: 
1. On May 20, 1942, ~ohn Thomas Carter and Eug·ene Pea_r-
son Macemore, the two above named def endauts, did receive 
from the Dorse~ ·wholesale. Liquor Company, Inc., Dorsey, 
'Maryland, who 1s a dµly licensed wholesale establishment · 
at the establishment or such concern in Dorsey, Maryland: 
I 
.\ 
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fifty-six (56) cases of assorted whiskies, containing one hun· 
dred sixty-eight gallons of whiskey, for the account of R. M. 
Williard, Tr a.ding as Eagle Distilling Company, Route No. 1, 
Thomasville, North Carolina. 
2. Jfha.t in Maryland, this whiskey was placed upon a 1938 
Ford Truck, bearing· North Carolina License No. 157 B/2 
237, which said truck was being jointly operated by Eugene 
Pearson Macemore, of Jonesville, North ·Carolina, and John 
Thomas Carter, of Thomasville, North Carolina.· 
· 3. The bill of lading· showed the whiskey to ha.ve been con-
signed to R. M. Williard T / A Eagle Distilling Company, 
Route 1, Thomasville, North Carolina, but contained no 
routeing for the truck to follow while in Virginia. 
4. That this truck left the State of Maryland and pro-
ceeded into the State· of Virginia, and was in the act of pass-
ing through the State of Virginia, destined to a point in 
North Carolina, when appr~hended in Rappahannock County, 
Virginia. 
5. That R. 1VI. Williard, Trading as E'agle Distilling Com-
pany, Route No. 1, Thomasville, North Carolina, who was the· 
consignee on the bill of lading of this whiskey, according to the 
laws of the State of North Carolina, coulq. not lawfully re-
ceive this shipment at its point of destination. 
page 12 ~ 6. That the truck within which this whiskey was 
being transported was registered in the name of 
Healton Miller of Winston-Salem, North ·Carolina, who on 
March 26, 19·42, posted a bond with approved surety, as re~ 
quired by law, with the Virginia .Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Board, and the Board did on that day issue a certificate 
of evidence that such bond had been posted, copies of tbe 
bond and certificate being made a part hereof as Exhibits A 
and B respectively. That on May 1, 1942, the Virginia 1\1-
. coholic Beverage Control Board did notify Healton Miller 
·of the cancellation of said bond and demanded the return 
of the certificate upon information that Healton Miller had 
the reputation of being· a bootlegger in North Carolina, with-
out anv evidence of a violation of the laws of the State of 
Virg-inia. 
7. That this whiskey was seized and turned over to the 
proper officer of the Court, in accordance with law, and the 
defendants, .John Thomas Carter and Eugene Pearson Mace-
more were arrested and charges with the violation of the law~ 
as set f ortl1 in the wauant. 




COMMONWEALTH O:B1 VIRGINIA 
DEPARTMENT OF .AI£)0H0LI0 BEVERAGE CONTROL 
.ALCOHOLIC BE v ERAGE CONTROL BOARD . 
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA. 
I 
K.i~OW ALL :M:.EN BY THESE PRESENTS, That I, 
HE.ALTON. MILLER, pf 1035 Albert Street, Winston-Sa-
lem, North · Carolina, Frindpal, and HARTFORD ACCI-
DENT AND INDEMNITY CO:MP ANY, Surety, are held 
and firmly bound unto the· Commonwealth of Virginia in the 
just and full ~um of One Thousand Dollars, to the 
page 13 t payment whe~·eof well and truly to be made, we 
bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administra-
tors, successors and assigns, jointly and severally, firmly by 
these presents; 
WHEREAS, the aboye bound principal desire~ to trans-
port alcoholic beverages within, into or through the State ·of 
Virginia, in accordance 1 with the regulations of the Virginia 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board adopted pursuant to the 
acts of the General As~embly of Virginia; 
NOW THEREFORE:: 
The condition of the j above obligation is such that, in the 
.event the said carrier' shall engage in the transportation 
and/or delivery of alcoholic beverages within, into or through 
the State of Virginia, !in a lnanner in conformity with the 
laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the regulations 
of the .Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, then the 
above obligation shall !be null and void; otherwise, it shall 
remain in full force, virtue and effect. 
It is understood that this bond may be cancelled by the 
Surety upon . giving thirty days' written notiye to the Vir.,. 
ginia Alco11olic Beverage Control Board at Richmond, Vir- ' 
ginia. 
IN WITNESS "WHEREOF, the said Healton Miller, Prin-
cipal, has signed · and sealed these presents · and the Surety 
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WELL, its duly authorized Attor~ey-in-],act, this 26th day 
of March, 1942. , 
HEALTON MILLER (Seal) 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY CO. 
Surety. 
By:ROBERT I. BOS"WELL (Seal) 
Attorney-in-fa~t. 
·COUNTE,RSIGNED 
ROBERT I. BOSWELL 
RESIDENT VIRGINIA AGENT 
page 14} EXHIBIT B. 
(To be posted in cab of truck) 
OOMMON\VEALTH OF VIRGINIA-
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board 
Richmond, Virginia 
No. 9484 
EVIDENCE OF BOND 
.Truck No. 1 Ford Carrier No. 324 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY That HEALTON MILLER OF 
WINSTON-=SALEM, NORTH CAROLINA, has filed with 
this Board, bond as required under the regulations govern-
ing the transportation of alcoholic beverages within, into or 
throug·h the State of Virginia in quantities in excess of One 





VIRGINIA ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE 
CONTROL BO.ARD 
By 0. W. McCLURE 
Traffic Manager-Division of Merchandising. 
I 
I I 
36 Supreme Coi;irt of Appeals of Virginia 
I 
(This EVIDENCE OfF BOND must be ;eturned to the 
Virginia .Alcoholic Beverage Control Board if and whenever 
called for) 
Said stipulated facts ~re hereby made a part of the record 
in this case and shall be enrolled as a part of the record 
thereo~ I 
· Be it further remembered that after the submission of said 
stipulated facts the said defendants by their attorneys came 
in open court in the presence of the attorney for 
page 15 ~ the Commonwealth and moved the Court to strike 
out all of thel evidence and to dismiss the warrant 
in thi~ ·case on the grounds that the acts of the defendants 
as charged in the said warrant and set forth in said stipula-
tion of facts do not con'.stitute a crime against the Common-· 
wealth because the reg"Ulations and Acts set forth in the war-
rant ·charging the defendants with violating the same are 




1. That under the provisions of Section 5 and Section 49-a 
of the Alcoholic Bever~ge Control Act, Chapter 94 of Acts 
of the General Assemoly of Virginia of 1934, as amended, 
Virginia Code Section 4675 ( 49-a) there was no authority 
delegated to make such i regulations as Sect.ions 42 and 44 of 
a regulation of the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Board, known as Order Number A-1, adopted August 30, 1940, 
in that such regulatiorts were not within the scope of the 
powers delegated to said Board under said Act. 
2. That the cancellatj on of the bond of Healton Miller on 
May 1, 1942, by the said Board was a discriminatory action 
and was unlawful and without authority under the provisions 
of said Act and said r~gulations. · 
3. That said Act is :unconstitutional insofar .that it con-
fers upon said Board tpe power to make said regulations, in 
that it violates Article IIII of the Constitution of Virginia in 
attempting· to delegate to said Board purely legislative pow-
ers and functions. I 
4. That said Act and said regulations are unconstitutional 
in that they
1 
violate Artiele I, Section 8, clause 3 
page l6 ~ of the Co11stitution of the United States of regu-
lating commerce between two States and/or im-
posing· a burden upon inter-state commerce. 
-5. That the cancellation of the bond of Healton Miller on 
~fay 1, 1942, by the said Board was unlawful and violative 
·of the defendants' rig1Jts under the provisions of .Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 3, of the Constitution of the United States. 
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And upon consideration of said motions the Court over-
ruled and denied the same, to which ruling the defendants 
excepted on the aforesaid grounds stated. 
Be it further remembered that after the judg·ment of the 
court of the guilt of the accused, the defendants came in 
open court in the presence of the attorney for the Common-
wealth and moved the court for a new trial on the identical 
gTounds assigned for their motions to strike out all of the 
evidence and to dismiss the warrant as hereinbefore set forth 
in full and upon consideration whereof said.motion was over-
ruled and denied, to which ruling of the Court the defendants 
excepted. 
To all of the aforesaid. rulings of the court the defend-
ants except and pray that this bill of exceptions may be 
signed, sealed and enrolled as a part of the record, which 
is done accordingly within the time prescribed by law, after 
it appeared in writing that the Commonwealth had been given 
reasonable notice of the time and place of presenting the 
same, this 28th day of September, 1942. 
J. R. H. ALEXANDER, (Seal) 
Judge of the Twenty-Sixth Judicial Circuit. 
page 17 ~ State of Virginia, 
County of Rappahannock, To-wit: 
I, James M. Settle, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Rappa-
hannock County, Virginia, do hereby certify that the fore-
going· is a correct copy of the record in the cause of Common-
wealth of Virginia v. ,John Thomas Carter and Eugene Pear-
son Macemore, Defendants, copied pursuant to the applica-
tion of said defendants bv counsel made to me on the 28th 
day of September, 1942, at two o'clock P. l\L at my office in 
vV ashington, Virginia. 
And I do further certifv that a notice of the intention of 
the said defendants to apply for a transcript of the record 
. in said cause was duly given to the Commonwealth through 
her Attorney, George H. Davis, Jr. 
JAMES lVI. SETTLE, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of R,appahannock 
County, Virginia. 
A Copy-Teste : 
lW. B. WATTS, C. 0. 
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